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Introduction 
 
The armed forces have played a major role in the history of Latin America between 
1959 and 1989, the period between the Cuban Revolution and the end of the Cold 
War. During this period, the majority of South-American countries experienced a 
period of military dictatorships. This entails a political system in which the armed 
forces possess reasonable political power, and the leader is a right-wing ruler who 
holds power through repression and military force rather than ideological appeal or 
charisma.  
Moreover, Latin American dictatorships can in general be considered as bureaucratic-
authoritarian, as rulers used state institutions to exercise their power. Of all the 
countries in the region, Brazil was one of the first to overthrow its democratic 
government in 1964 and one of the last to return to democracy in 1985. This 21-year 
period of military rule has extensively been studied by both Brazilian and foreign 
political scientists. Common features in these studies are the support given by the 
United States sustaining the dictatorship,  the paramount human rights violations, the 
return to democracy after 1985, Brazil’s impressive economic growth during the 
heyday of its military rule and its foreign policy.  
My focus will be on the last two aspects and, due to the limited scope of this thesis, 
most attention will be dedicated to a specific period of the military dictatorship, 
namely the administration of general Ernesto Geisel, that was in office between 1974 
and 1979. Not only did Geisel come up with the new term responsible pragmatism to 
frame Brazil’s behaviour on the international stage, this framing was a reaction to a 
very interesting period in international history which provided several challenges for 
Brazil’s ambition to become an important global power, spurred by economic growth.  
 
When Geisel assumed office in 1974, the international stage had changed drastically. 
Brazilian authorities referred to the post-1973 period as ‘international equation.’ 
Central features of this equation were the vacuum in international leadership, the 
emergence of partial multipolarity and the decline of American hegemony.1 This 
equation reflected in the fact that the Vietnam War was heading towards a clashing 
defeat for the United States. Furthermore, the Carnation Revolution had triumphed in 
                                           
1 This is the online accessible archive of president Geisel. Hereafter this archive will be referred to as (Geisel, name page). The 
link is enlisted in the bibliography. 
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Lisbon, inducing Portugal to dismantle its colonial empire and thereby giving birth to 
several Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa. Moreover, the Cold War enjoyed a 
period of relative relaxation known as détente, which allowed Brazil to present itself 
on the world stage outside the binary East-West and capitalism-communism divisions 
and  allowing to establish ties with establish ties with the Soviet-Union and Eastern 
Europe. But above all, there was the aftermath of the 1973-1974 Oil Crisis, when the 
price of oil had risen with 400% between October 1973 and March 1974. For Brazil, 
which depended for 80% on imported oil, this was obviously disastrous.   
All the above-mentioned factors motivated president Geisel to rephrase his foreign 
policy to meet these new economic opportunities and challenges. These challenges 
could only be confronted by adopting a pragmatic attitude: 2 
 
‘We aim to be pragmatic in our relations with other countries, highlighting our 
points of cooperation rather than divergence. We believe that cooperation produces 
better results than antagonism. We are not opportunist, but keep our eyes on the long 
term. The prospect of the administration always has to be the future of our nation.’ 
 
According to Geisel, the best answer to these challenges was responsible 
pragmatism, aimed at averting automatic alliances, maintaining flexibility in order to 
negotiate the best outcome, in order to enhance Brazil’s autonomy on the world stage. 
This thesis will aim to provide an answer to whether or not Brazil’s economic 
autonomy was significantly enhanced by Geisel’s responsible pragmatism and 
whether his newly introduced attitude represented a major breaking point in Brazil’s 
foreign policy. Peter Evans’ thorough analysis of the relationship between economic 
development and dependency was very helpful to study some of responsible 
pragmatism’s aspects. In his 1979 work Dependent Development: The Alliance of 
Multinational State and Local Capital in Brazil, he describes Brazil under military 
rule to be caught up in a phase of ‘dependent development’, in which it is able to 
reach excessive levels of economic growth but is retains a level of dependency on the 
countries in the center of the structural center-periphery model and center-based 
multinationals. This theory will be elaborated further in the chapter 1, which will also 
further outline Geisel’s motivations and considerations for responsible pragmatism as 
                                           
2 Expressed by president Geisel in a dialogue with minister-president Antônio Azeredo da Silveira, answering the latter’s 
question about how he saw the future of the Latin American continent, available in his online accessible archive at page 1192. 
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well as provide a literature review of what other scholars have written on responsible 
pragmatism. Chapter 2 deals with the historical backgrounds of Brazilian foreign 
policy by contextualizing Brazil’s role in the world and, equally important, the role of 
the world in Brazil. What was Brazilian foreign policy in the pre-1964 era like? An 
important aspect in this historical contextualization is analyzing Brazil’s historical 
relationship with the United States and Western Europe. These historical relationships 
are important to analyze whether responsible pragmatism marked a continuity or a 
discontinuity concerning bilateral relations and the level of autonomy.  
Chapter 3 will aim to answer the question whether Geisel’s responsible 
pragmatism led to an increased level of autonomy. I will analyze this by focusing on a 
couple of aspects that were central to his new foreign policy. The first feature is his 
plan to exploit the Amazon to make fully use of Brazil’s abundant natural resources 
and economic potential. The second feature is his nuclear agreement with West-
Germany in 1975, which was supposed to provide Brazil with nuclear know-how and 
credit to build nuclear power plants in order to develop as a nuclear power. The third 
aspect is the influence the accession of the American president Jimmy Carter in 1977 
had on Brazil’s room for maneuver in international politics. The last aspect that will 
be discussed is Geisel’s Arab Turn in response to the Oil Crisis. As a result of the 
increased oil prices and subsequent trade deficit in Brazil, Geisel decided to 
strengthen ties with Arab countries. These ties will be analyzed in order to provide a 
detailed answer to the question whether Geisel’s responsible pragmatism and 
subsequent diversified ties, markets and alliances in fact led to an increase of Brazil’s 
autonomy on the international stage.  
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Chapter 1: Development, autonomy and responsible pragmatism in Brazil 
 
This chapter will deal with the three central aspects in this thesis. The first section 
provides an overview of the dependent development model and their link to a nation’s 
autonomy. The second and third part elaborate on the president Geisel’s motivations 
to embark on responsible pragmatism, with an overview of the scholarly debate on 
this topic. 
 
1.1 Dependent development and autonomy 
 
Two aspects are central in studying Brazil’s foreign policy under president Geisel. 
Like many Latin American countries, Brazil manifested more assertiveness on the 
international stage in the 1970’s.  In the scholarly debate, several theories link 
autonomy to development. The debate centers around the question whether autonomy 
is a prerequisite for development (and therefore, dependence leads to 
underdevelopment, the classical dependency theory). Conversely, the Argentinian 
political scientist Carlos Escudé sustains the opposite view, arguing that ‘wealth and 
development are indispensable for autonomy’ (Dominguez and Covarrubias 2015, pp. 
81-82). This touches upon the dependent development model, arguing that ‘the steps 
needed to achieve economic development are self-defeating because they condition it 
to the preservation of subordinate, dependent relations and the acceptance of the 
economic and political rules of the game established by dominant political actors’ 
(Dominguez and Covarrubias, pp. 81-82).  
The dependent development model which will be used as lens through which 
Geisel’s policy will be studied in the last chapter of this thesis, derives from Peter 
Evans work Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational State and Local 
Capital in Brazil (1979). Dependent development is one of the versions of the 
classical dependency theory, sharing the one common feature with all of them: ‘all of 
them include the need to link international dimension with the national one’ (Hurrell 
2013, p. 9). 
Classical development theory in the academic field emerged after WWII.  As 
James A. Caporaso has put it, since the forming of two ideological blocs, and the 
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ongoing dissolution of European colonial empires, ‘the world had many ‘new 
nations’, a term almost a synonym for less developed countries’ (Caporaso 1980, p. 
610). This newly emerged ‘Third World’ came into being next to the capitalist and the 
communist world. Western academic discourse, known as the ‘modernization theory’ 
held that lesser develop countries could reach the same level of development as 
Western countries, by imitating the Western path of industrialization and 
development.  In this context, ‘industrializing and developing’ were terms referring to 
a process of ‘catching up with the West’ and defined by Western standards for 
measuring a country’s level of development (Joshi 2005). The basic assumption of 
modernization theory that is challenged by dependency theorists, is that Third World 
countries can reach the same level of development as Western countries. Rather, 
dependency theorists argue, Western countries are developed because these countries 
are underdeveloped. Underdevelopment therefore, is not a condition, but is an 
inevitable result of development of richer countries. The historical component in this 
theory is that centuries of colonialism, imperialism and trade regulations have resulted 
in the West to prosper, while leaving underdeveloped countries poor. Traditional 
dependency theory invented a binary division between periphery and center, in which 
the first provides cheap labour, natural resources and easy accessible markets, in order 
for the latter (possessing the capital, knowledge and technology) to develop 
economically. As the development of wealthier nations happens at the expense of 
poorer nations, a country in the periphery can never really develop. 
This last notion is contested in the work of Peter Evans. He argues that, even 
though Brazil remained to a certain extent dependent on decisions made outside 
Brazil, economic development was indeed possible, pointing at the enormous ratio of 
economic growth that Brazil had been enjoying since the end of the 1960’s, known as 
the Brazilian miracle. With the term ‘dependent development’, Evans is referring to 
cases ‘where capital accumulation and diversified industrialization are dominating the 
transformation of its economy and social structure’ (Evans 1979, p. 32). Brazil as 
developing and dependent at the same time, instead of just dependent. Dependent 
development, as Evans describes it, ‘is a special instance of dependency, 
characterized by the association or alliance of international and local capital’ (Evans, 
p. 32). The state joins this alliance, resulting in a triple alliance, the driving force of 
Brazil’s development. Multinationals yield more profit than can be obtained at the 
domestic market and Brazilian elites enjoy a localization of profit and control over 
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this localization. The local elites can decide where capital flows, how much is 
invested and in what sectors. As a result, a market for luxury products is created, 
which is only accessible for elites. The state is an important force in bargaining 
between the interests of multinationals and local capital, as they must ‘continually 
coerce or cajole the multinationals into undertaking roles they would otherwise 
abdicate’ (Evans, p. 44) Opposing multinationals when in capital accumulation 
interests are at stake, is a state task in dependent development. To serve the country’s 
interests, states have to promote peripheral industrialization and attracting local and 
foreign capital. On the other hand, states have to provide a beneficial investing 
climate, by repressing labour movements and keeping down wages.   
Consequently, all three partners ‘have a common interest in capital accumulation 
and in the subordination of the mass population’ (Evans, p. 52). As a result, all benefit 
from this alliance, resulting in the Brazilian miracle between 1969 and 1974. 
However, the fact the Brazilian state and local elites benefited managed to achieve an 
enormous economic growth, does not downplay their dependent status. To a high 
degree, Brazil remained dependent on foreign capital and foreign-based 
multinationals. This core element of the Peter Evans’ theory of dependent 
development will be used as a theoretical lens to analyze the foreign policy of the 
Geisel-administration in the last chapter. 
 
1.2 Geisel's motivations for responsible pragmatism 
 
 The following section will deal with the Geisel-administration’s political and 
economic motivations to introduce responsible pragmatism in foreign policy. As 
briefly described in the introduction, the international stage had changed drastically 
when Geisel assumed office. This posed several opportunities and challenges. This 
opted for a new orientation on Brazil’s foreign policy, which received the name 
‘responsible pragmatism’ and can be seen as an attempt to turn these challenges into 
opportunities. The period around 1973 offered the chance to Brazil to re-evaluate its 
position in the world. 
Responsible pragmatism was a reaction to the international challenges the Geisel-
administration was about to face. Ongoing tendencies in international politics burst 
out dramatically from October 1973 onwards. First of all, the outbreak of the Oil 
Crisis led to a quadrupling of petrol prices, resulting in a negative balance of payment, 
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inflation, currency instability and recession. These factors were seriously hampering 
Brazil’s national economic development. On top of that the international balance of 
power was shifting. The détente was perceived as a vacuum of international 
leadership, yet again because the United States hegemony was declining with its 
humiliating defeat in Vietnam. Furthermore, the dissolution of the Portuguese colonial 
empire allowed for a rapprochement between Brazil and the newly emerged 
Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa (Roa & Baptista e Silva 2015, p. 4) 
This new international reality called for a reiteration of Brazilian foreign policy. 
Driven by its economic growth in the years before 1974, Brazilian envisioned an 
important role for itself in this new international reality, as ‘the political-military 
vacuum objectively augmented our international responsibilities, that are imposed on 
us by our size and the geopolitical reality and, above all, our historical destiny’ 
(Geisel, p. 2875).  Its territorial size, its large population and its ambition, as reflected 
in the achieved economic growth had an inevitable consequence: Brazil had to assume 
the role of a major player on the world stage (Geisel, pp. 2875-76). 
The new international reality not only posed challenges, but also provided high 
hopes and a ‘maximization of opportunities and an optimization of strategic 
alternatives’ which offered a chance for Brazil to assert itself (Geisel, p. 2876).  In 
September 1974, the Geisel government drafted the National Development Plan: 
1975-1979, which set an economic target on 10% annual growth (Skidmore 1990). 
However, to make full use of the opportunities the new international reality offered, a 
new blueprint for foreign policy was needed. Therefore, the new foreign policy had to 
be pragmatic and had to be strictly in line with national interest and in accordance 
with its values, ambitions and general orientation (Geisel, p. 2853). Important aspects 
of this general orientation were the strict adherence to principles of self-
determination, non-intervention and the conviction that diplomatic ties between 
countries cannot be determined on the basis of ideology. Within this orientation, 
Brazil would have to explore the various roads and the various bargains leading to the 
same goal. This was not always a choice between good or bad, but might as well be a 
choice between a greater and a lesser evil. This pragmatism consisted of an 
assessment of various factors and the most profitable option, in accordance with its 
ideals. This last part is what added the word ‘responsible’ to pragmatism.  
Responsible pragmatism required a plan of approach, referred to by Geisel as 
‘general action points.’ As Brazil was a Lusophone, Latin American, viscerally 
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occidental and a Capitalist country, with ties with Eastern Europe but firmly anti-
communist. Additionally, Brazil was a member of the UN, G77 (loose coalition of 
developing nations within the UN), OAS (Organization of American States) and the 
Non-Aligned movement. On top of that, Brazil had economic and commercial interest 
in every continent and in terms of energy, highly dependent on Arab countries. This 
diversity motivated the Brazilian government to avoid any automatic alignments, 
incompatible with its national interests and contradictory to the international politics 
of détente and interdependence. This would ensure that Brazil would have access to 
the best markets for its products. (Geisel, p.2840) 
Secondly, with the new foreign policy, Brazil had, as a Lusophone country, special 
attention for Portugal’s ex-colonies and newly emerged states in Africa. This was part 
of a greater strategy, namely Brazil’s commitment to developing countries in the 
Third World, which opened new markets and could contribute to the diversification of 
the Brazilian economy.  
 
1.3 Responsible pragmatism in the scholarly debate 
 
Most Western sources that deal with the government Geisel focus on economic, social 
and military politics. In regard to the latter, terms distensão (détente) and abertura 
(opening) are associated with Geisel. Thomas Skidmore considers his policy as a 
‘gradual and highly controlled political liberalization’ (Skidmore, p. 165). David 
Collier adds that ‘in this somewhat more relaxed, but still authoritarian framework, 
there was considerable uncertainty about the economic and social directions which 
Brazil would take in the second half of the 1970’s’(Collier 1979, p.175).This 
economic policy centered around how to decrease Brazil’s continuously increasing 
foreign debt and domestic inflations. How economic and political realities motivated 
the implementation of responsible pragmatism is described by both Andrew Hurrell 
and Leticia Pinheiro. All aforementioned economic difficulties called for new sources 
of capital, technology and energy (Pinheiro 1994). 
However, both authors acknowledge that the term responsible pragmatism was not 
completely new. Pinheiro argues that ‘’Brazil was already well on the way in the 
redefinition of foreign policy, which was implemented soon after the 1964 coup, as 
the disengagement from the US, and the move towards Western Europe, Japan, the 
Socialist and the Third World countries exemplified’ (Pinheiro 1994, pp. 112-13. 
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Hurrell (201, pp.256-260) shares the view that ‘’much of the explanation for the 
increasingly independent character of Brazilian foreign policy during the Geisel 
period lies in the further development of trends that had begun in the late 1960.’’ The 
historical contextualization of Brazilian foreign relations will be dealt with in the next 
chapter, so for now it suffices to mention that the introduction of responsible 
pragmatism was not a major breakthrough in Brazilian foreign policy. This is not to 
say, however, that Geisel’s input in foreign reiteration was negligible. As Pinheiro 
puts it, ‘it was only during Geisel’s government that a decisive redirection was 
actually implemented’(Pinheiro, p. 113). Hurrell adds that it was only during the 
Geisel government that economic difficulties and internal factors required an 
adjustment in foreign policy.              
Brazilian authors have studied responsible pragmatism more extensively. Luiz 
Fernando Ligiéro wrote an extensive report in which he compared responsible 
pragmatism with the ‘Politica Externa Indepente’ (Independent foreign policy) of 
Janio Quadros and his successor João Goulart in the period 1961-1964, in the period 
predating the establishment of the military dictatorship. He concludes that even 
though its origins are different, the fact that Brazil’s foreign policy is revised in favor 
of national development is not a new phenomenon in the country’s political history. In 
this regard, responsible pragmatism was a way of confronting economic crises by 
redefining Brazil’s position on the world stage and its relations vis-à-vis with other 
countries is not new. Therefore, his comparison argues that there were ‘many 
similarities and some differences’ (Ligiéro 2011).  What made responsible 
pragmatism unique, was that the shifting of the balance of power in the world offered 
an unique situation, opening up for the creation of new alliances, partnerships and the 
Third World. According to Ligueiro, responsible pragmatism was the first attempt to 
develop ties with all the quarters of the world, thereby resulting in an enhancement of 
autonomy on the world stage and a less dependency on the United States (Ligiéro 
2011, pp. 409-410). 
Matias Spektor shared this view, pointing at that the uniqueness of responsible 
pragmatism lied in its ability to define Brazil’s relations with all the corners of the 
world, which made the Geisel’s reign ‘a period of important, and in some cases 
systematical redefinitions of Brazilian behaviour on the world stage’ (Spektor 2004, p. 
196-197). However, this notion is contested by many others. As authors like Lisandra 
Gobo and Paolo Vizentini argue, many of these redefinitions were already in the 
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process of development before Geisel got to power.  For example, relations with the 
United States were already on the wane. Gobo showed that new ties with Asia were 
made possible by frequent visits by officials and diplomats from the Médici 
government (Lisandra Gobo 2009). Paolo Vizentini argued that the international 
context, in which responsible pragmatism was formulated, was unique but that its 
features were strictly in line with tendencies of Brazilian foreign policy (Vizentini 
2004, chapter 4). 
 
Chapter 2: Contextualizing Brazil’s foreign involvement: An historical review  
 
Since most of the literature does not consider responsible pragmatism to be a major 
rupture in Brazilian foreign policy, but rather in line with the historical tendencies. 
Therefore, this chapter will discuss the historical contextualization of Brazil’s foreign 
policy before 1964 and a subsequent brief overview of Brazil’s relations with Western 
Europe and the United States. 
Even though Brazil’s political structure changed drastically after Goulart’s 
overthrowal and the establishment of the military dictatorship in 1964, the country’s 
foreign policy is not an isolated entity. The Geisel-administration did not invent its 
foreign policy, but rather developed it as part of a broader historical context. 
Furthermore, studying foreign policy is not just analyzing the role of Brazil in the 
world, but also analyzing the role of the world in Brazil.  Regarding this, Geisel’s 
foreign policy is a continuation of a broader political pattern, which can be led back to 
the period since the Second World War and the period predating the military coup. 
The following sections will provide a historical contextualization of Brazil’s foreign 
policy and its relations with the United States and Western Europe.  
 
2.1 Brazil’s foreign policy before 1964 
 
Brazil had already experienced a military dictatorship, under leadership of Getúlio 
Vargas (1930-1945), in which he desired to transform Brazil from a plantage-based 
economy to an industrialized, developed nation. This could only be done by 
protecting the Brazilian investors’ interests by handing out government subsidies and 
establishing import quotas and tariffs on foreign products (Galván 2013, p. 42). These 
measures were carried out in order to foster the development of a Brazilian industrial 
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class and to limit the dependency on foreign products. However, this process had just 
taken off. Gerson Moura described Brazil’s foreign policy in the thirties as ‘’an 
oscillation between one great power and the other in terms of commercial, political 
and military issues’’ (Moura 2013, p. 68). The term he attaches to this oscillation is, 
pragmatic equilibrium, in general between the US and Germany. The underlying 
thought was that refraining from a firm alliance with one country, it could benefit 
economically from trade with the other. As a result, this policy led to an increase in 
bargaining power in numerous occasions, as well as a reluctance to pick a side in the 
war between its allies in WWII. However, Brazil only managed to remain neutral until 
1942.   
1942 marked a radical turning point in Vargas’ foreign policy. Practical 
equilibrium proved inviable and was therefore replaced with a strict alliance with the 
US, because Vargas perceived that the US had more to offer in terms of economic 
benefits, from which the American Lend-Lease Aid in 1941, an arrangement in which 
Vargas agreed to ‘supply raw materials and provide naval bases in return for 
American arms and financial assistance for the construction of the Volta Redonda 
power plant, which was to become the symbol of Brazilian development and 
industrialization’ (Smith 2002). After Brazilians ships suffered attacks from German 
submarines, an official declaration of War was signed in the summer of 1942. The 
pragmatic character of Brazil’s foreign policy already showed in the Vargas era. 
Despite Nazi-Germany expansionism, racial politics and fascism, Brazil refrained 
from breaking ties with Hitler and joining the Allied just after this had proven to be of 
more economic advantages (Smith 2002). 
After WWII, Vargas’ military dictatorship was replaced by a democratic 
government under the wings of Eurico Dutra. Under his auspices Brazil joined the UN 
and signed a military agreement with the United States, in which he hoped to secure 
future economic assistance from the US in industrializing Brazil. However, since 
Latin-America did not enter the Cold War theatre, Brazil was of little geopolitical 
importance to the US, which focused most of its economic aid package on Europe. 
This attitude by Washington induced Brazil to focus more on its relationship with its 
Spanish-speaking neighbors and to concern itself with its role as a hegemon in the 
Southern Hemisphere. In the early 1960’s, after the Cuban revolution had dragged 
Latin-America into the Cold War theatre, president Janio Quadros advocated the 
Politica Externa Independente (independent foreign policy). Components of this 
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policy were an emphasis on self-determination, a refusal to break diplomatic ties with 
neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba and opposing an American intervention in Cuba. 
Quadros motivated his independent policy by this famous quote: ‘not being members 
of any bloc, not even the neutralist bloc, we preserve our absolute freedom to make 
our own decisions in specific cases and in the light of peaceful suggestions at one with 
our nature and history’ (Quadros 1961, p. 26), which comes remarkably close to 
responsible pragmatism. Quadros’ successor, João Goulart, reiterated these principles, 
but lacked every support in his government and was regarded with great suspicion by 
the armed forces. Events accelerated with the ongoing economic difficulties Brazil 
was facing, which eventually led to the overthrowal of Goulart by the armed forces in 
1964.  
 
2.2 Historical context of Brazil-US relations 
 
The notion of Brazil’s military leaders as inseparable allies of the United States is a 
firmly held in history writing. Brazil has been a Western ally throughout most of the 
twentieth century, its military leaders are even more ruthless combating communism 
than the United States and the countries’ trade partnerships go back decades. 
However, this assumption has recently been on the wane. The historical alliance 
between Brazil and the United States has not been so strong and tight as is often 
perceived. On the contrary, American attitudes have often excited irritation and 
defiance in Brazil.  
As aforementioned, in WWII, the US and Germany battled for influence in Brazil, 
which only allied itself with the US in 1942 when that country had more to offer in 
terms of economic advantages. In the period after WWII, Brazil advocated strict 
alliance with the US in terms of foreign policy and breaking ties with the Soviet 
Union. 
Brazil-US relations cooled after Jânio Quadros assumed office in 1961. His 
previously described Politica Externa Indepedente which allowed for trade with the 
Communist bloc, advocated rights for self-determination and supported the principle 
of non-intervention.  This comprised of a condemnation of the Bay of Pigs-invasion 
and a fierce opposition to a military intervention in Cuba (Hershberg 2004). This 
contravened the blueprint for American foreign policy towards Latin-America, known 
as the Alliance for Progress, which, quoting Stephen Rabe, ‘was used for building 
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sturdy, self-reliant, anti-Communist societies’ (Rabe 1999, p. 32). The Alliance for 
Progress was drafted in the period after the Cuban Revolution, which transformed 
Latin-America into an area where the Cold War could not be won, but could be lost. 
This made Brazil, due to its size and population, of vital importance to the United 
States.  
The conflicting ideals made Brazil-US relations increasingly tense. After Quadros’ 
resignation in 1961, Joao Goulart came to power.   He was not regarded favourably in 
Washington, where he was known for his connections with ‘leftist’ groups in trade 
unions and parliament.  
Ruth Leacock, one of the leading scholars on the US-Brazil relations in the sixties, 
explains the deterioration primarily in economic terms, mainly stressing the 
importance of the Draper Report, a report drafted by a commission led by former 
general William Draper and existing of officials coming from different departments 
and agencies (CIA, Treasury Department and Defense Department).  As Leacock 
shows, the Draper Report concluded that the Brazilian economy suffered from some 
serious economic setback which could only be brought a halt by overthrowing 
Goulart, as he would not be willing to implement the economic reform necessary to 
stop the ever-increasing levels of inflation and fill Brazil’s enormous trade deficit. 
Draper concluded that the Goulart had been ‘pursuing illogical and wasteful policies 
that prevented sound development and balanced growth’ (Leacock 1990, p. 125).  
According to Leacock, this was due to a great extent to the ineptitude and static 
policies of Goulart which highly contributed to mobilization of military and 
conservative forces opposing the government, which, unsurprisingly, was not 
regretted by American officials (Leacock 1990). Concluding, the stringent 
deterioration of Brazil-US relations in the pre-1964 era, resulted in American support 
for the military coup. 
 
2.3  Brazil and Western Europe 
 
As relations with the US deteriorated in this period, relations with Western Europe 
were consolidated. President Kubitschek used the tensions with the US to build 
strategic partnerships with Western European countries. 
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An economic partnership with West-Germany was already sealed in the end of the 
1950’s, under the Kubitschek-administration, when the rebuilding of the German 
post-war economy culminated in the Wirtschaftswunder (Lohbauer 2000). 
Components of this German miracle were the widening of its markets and the 
exploitation of new areas, and Brazil was one of them (most famous examples the car 
manufacturers Mercedes Benz and Volkswagen). However, German participation in 
Brazilian economic development was fortified in the early sixties, right after the 
establishment of the military dictatorship. At this time, Brazil was the largest Latin-
American exporter to West-Germany and Heinrich Lübke, then president, ascertained 
an increasing flux of investment in several infrastructural projects in Brazil. Even 
though the heyday of Brazil-West Germany relations took place during the Geisel 
administration, a strategic partnership, however limited, was already agreed before his 
reign and friendly relations already established.  
However, it was only since the military coup that Western Europe received 
profound attention in Brazil. According to Paolo Vizentini, this ‘European turn’ was 
again motivated by tension with the US. Brazil’s military leaders understood, just like 
the ‘Politica Externa Independente’, that escaping the orbit of the US was necessary to 
increase the range of contacts with other parts of the globe’ (Perla Martins 2015, p. 
13). Artur da Costa e Silva, then president, motivated his objective to deepen relations 
with Western Europa by expressing his ‘wish to strengthen our cultural and political 
identities with these countries by means of cultural, economic and political exchange’ 
(Perla Martins 2015, p. 13). In this regard, according to Perla Martins, the foundations 
of Geisel’s rapprochement to Western Europe, were laid by the Costa e Silva 
government.  
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Chapter 3: Responsible pragmatism: enhancing autonomy? 
 
This final chapter will analyze four aspects of the foreign policy of the Geisel 
administration. As explained before, Geisel’s responsible pragmatism was aimed at 
creating pragmatic and strategic partnerships, abstain from automatic alliances and 
diversify its economy, all aimed at enhancing the autonomy of Brazil on the 
international stage. Four aspects of Geisel’s foreign policy stand out. The first one is 
his rapprochement to the Arab World, in response to the 1973 Oil Crisis and Brazil’s 
high dependence on foreign petrol. Was this an act of dependency or an assertion of 
autonomy? 
Secondly, it was only under Geisel that the Amazon entered Brazil’s foreign policy 
agenda and subsequently, foreign investors were invited to exploit the forest’s 
resources. Is the dependent-development model applicable to the exploitation of the 
Amazon? 
Thirdly, under Geisel Brazil started to develop the ambition to gain nuclear 
independence. What does this ambition, and the international response to this 
ambition, say about Brazil’s autonomy on the world stage? 
Finally, what does the deterioration of US-Brazil relations under the American 
president Carter say about Brazil’s ability to act independently on the world stage?  
These four aspects provide an answer to the question whether Geisel’s responsible 
pragmatism substantially enhanced Brazilian autonomy.  
 
3.1 Geisel's Arab Turn in response to the Oil Crisis 
 
The Oil Crisis started as an Arab Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC, including Egypt 
and Syria), proclaimed an oil embargo against the US, Canada, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands. This was a reaction to the American involvement in 
the Yom Kippur War, a military campaign launched by Syria and Egypt against Israel. 
The US replied by sending arms and money to its ally. This incurred the hostility of 
OPEC against the US and its allies, leading to an initial increase of the price of oil by 
70%. By the end of the embargo, in March 1974, the price of a barrel of oil had 
quadrupled.  
It goes without saying that the Oil Crisis had a devastating effect on Brazilian 
economy, as it was for 80% dependent on imported petrol. Amidst its rapid 
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industrialization and increasing petrol consumption, the immediate effects were felt in 
the country’s trade deficit. Brazil started signing serval agreements with Arab 
Countries (with Algeria and Egypt and Iraq in 1975, to stipulate to exchange Arab oil 
with Brazilian weaponry. Notwithstanding, Brazilian sales to Arab countries also 
included products like cars, soy, sugar, iron, corn and planes, all labor-intensive 
products, aimed to compensate the import deficit caused by petrol (De Vasconcelos 
Cruz 2009).The political facilitation of the new partnerships with the Arab World 
followed with the Brazilian vote in UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 on 
November 10, 1975. This resolution was titled ‘Zionism is a form of racism and racial 
discrimination.’3 In this resolution UN member states voted whether or not they 
would condemn Zionism as a racist and imperialist ideology and a threat to world 
peace. The Resolution was passed with 72 votes for and 35 against (while 32 
countries abstained from voting). The 72 votes for comprised of the Islamic countries, 
the Soviet aligned Bloc, Lusophone Africa and also included Brazil. To go into too 
much detail about the history and context of this resolution is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Hence, I will in line with this thesis, focus on Brazilian motivations to vote in 
favor of the resolution. What does the Brazilian vote tell us about their foreign policy 
and their position in the world? Is it a result of a wholehearted political conviction or 
motivated by economic interests? 
In a telegram Brazil motivated its stance, by pointing at the fact that its vote was 
not an anti-Semitic vote, as Brazil clearly distinguished between Judaism and 
Zionism. And in Brazil, there did not exist any restrictions on religion (Geisel, p. 
767). Furthermore, the vote was not to repudiate the recognition of the state of Israel. 
Rather, the Brazilian vote was given in by a ‘recognition of the actual situation’ 
(Geisel, p. 767-8). According to the telegram, Zionism is a form of racism because 
‘being Zionist entails a preponderance of one ethnic group over the other’(Geisel, p. 
768). Added to that, the decision of the Brazilian delegation should be seen in the 
context of Palestine. In line with traditional Brazilian principles of auto-determination 
and anti-colonialism, it denounced Israelian occupation by force of Palestinian 
territory. The telegram ends with the reiteration of Brazilian national interests with a 
clear reference to pragmatism and the evasion of automatic alliances. 
                                           
3 Resolution 3379 (XXX), November 10, 1975, “Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination”, 
approved by a vote of 72 to 35, with 32 abstentions. The resolution 3379 was subsequently rescinded 
by UNGA resolution 46/86, of December 1991, adopted by a vote of 111 to 25, with 13 abstentions. 
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However, political motivations seem to be subordinated to economic interests with 
regards to this question. The New York Times headline shouted that ‘Brazil’s 
conscienceless military dictators are seeking Arab oil and investments with their 
votes’ (The New York Times, November 13, 1975).  This exclamation lacks nuance, 
but is serves as a signal that the relations between US and Brazil were under severe 
pressure. Several scholars in the last forty years have shown that the Brazilian vote for 
the Resolution was ‘a cornerstone in Brazil’s search for universalism’ (Dos Santos 
and Uziel 2015, Lessa 2000). 
Dos Santos and Uziel (2015, p. 6) summarize the general purposes of the new 
Brazilian foreign policy as ‘expanding markets, attracting investors, ensuring the 
supply of raw materials, and avoiding being tied up to the policies of its partners.’ 
These purposes are in line with the position on the international stage that Brazil 
envisioned for itself, in defense of its three major principles of self-determination, 
non-intervention and territorial integrity.  These principles came to the fore in the 
1974 speech of Brazil’s minister of External Relations, Antônio Silveira, to the UN 
General Assembly, in which he urged the UN to take the adequate steps to relieve 
Palestinian suffering in the Middle East (Santos Corrêa 2007, p. 315). Seeking 
rapprochement to Arab Countries and exclaiming support for the Palestinian cause 
would inevitably lead to tension with the United States.  Hence, several scholars have 
explained the Brazilian vote as marking the non-alignment with the US and restating 
Brazil’s autonomy to act (Dos Santos 2009, Lessa 2000, Casaroes & Vigevani 2014), 
all the more because a Brazilian abstention to vote would unlikely lead to severe 
repercussions against Brazil on the part of the Arab countries, which led to the 
abovementioned scholars’ explanation of Brazil’s vote as an Arab Turn.  Especially 
since the oil embargo had terminated in already in 1974, the direct impact of oil is 
hard to measure.  Therefore, Brazil’s Arab Turn should not be seen as an attempt to 
get closer to the Arab countries, but as an attempt to fully explore the country’s 
possibilities in the international sphere and picking the fruits of an international 
environment in a state of flux.  Hence, as Spektor (2004) and Dos Santos and Uziel 
(2015) have noted, Geisel’s policy towards the Middle East was not an act of defiance 
against Western values, but rather an attempt to explore its autonomy within them. 
Geisel’s Arab Turn serves as an excellent example of how responsible pragmatism 
served in practice, as it were foremost economic necessities that drove Geisel to alter 
its strategy towards the Arab world. Hurrell (2009, p. 300), shows that ‘the quotation 
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of rising oil prices and heavy dependence on Middle East oil meant that Brazil’s 
imports from the Middle East rose from US$ 2,091 million (17% of total imports) in 
1974 to US$ 5,081 million (32% of total imports) in 1979, with Brazil’s trade deficit 
with the region averaging US$ 2.9 billion p.a. in the years between 1974 and 1979. 
Hurrell argues that it was against this economic picture and massive trade deficit 
that this pro-Arab policy was adopted. This notion is all the more reinforced as there 
are no historically political motivations for Geisel’s Arab Turn. After all, Brazil had 
played a large role in the creation of the Israeli state in 1948. Oswaldo Aranha had 
lobbied heavily at the UN in favor of the partition of Palestina and Brazil was one of 
the first countries to recognize Israel as a newborn state. Furthermore, none of 
Brazil’s post-WW II governments have ever publicly supported anti-semitism or used 
any anti-Israelic language.  
 
 
3.2 First come, first served: the exploitation of the Amazon 
 
It was under the Geisel administration that the Amazon, until the seventies relatively 
absent factor in Brazilian foreign policy, commenced to be used as a means to yield 
foreign currency through export. From 1974 onwards, the Amazon was seen as a 
valuable contribution to the goods that could be produced for the world market. At the 
same time, the Geisel administration policy on the Amazon is a most striking example 
of dependent development in practice, and how economic concessions were given to 
foreign multinationals and capitalist to exploit the Amazon in order to maintain the 
rapid short term economic growth. 
Geisel embarked on a new development plan for the Amazon, POLAMAZONIA, 
based on achieving full exploitation of the fifteen so-called ‘growth poles.’ These 
poles were the sectors where the financial resources would be concentrated as they 
were believed to yield most foreign exchange and served as a legitimation for massive 
investment projects in mining, industry and ranching (Maurer 1979; Jepma 2014; 
Kincaid & Portes 1994).  
SUDAM, an already in 1966 established company to promote development of the 
Amazon region by granting tax incentives to both national and foreign parties, granted 
tax cuts to enormous cattle ranches, which added to the number of foreign-owned 
farms and ranches in the Amazon (Maurer 1979), most notably a 678.000 hectare in 
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Mato Grosso owned by the Italian firm Liquigas and 140000 hectare cattle ranch in 
Pará, owned by Volkswagen (Bunker 1985, p. 116).   
This fact posed by Bunker are in congruence with Peter Evans’ theory, suggesting 
that the Brazilian state only holds considerable autonomy in the Triple Alliance, when 
state interests and foreign capital interests overlap and that ‘the relative power of each 
of the members of the Triple Alliance varies with the differential bargaining power of 
and with the shifting points of common interest among the three ‘allies’ in national 
economy’ (Bunker 1985, p. 115). This meant in practice that foreign investors and 
multinationals benefited from the financial and tax cuts to exploit the Amazon and the 
state from a direct short-term capital influx.  
However, besides foreign-owned cattle ranches, two other Amazon projects 
rendered the most publicity. Several multinationals were invited to exploit the 
Amazon, the best known are the Jari Project, a deal sealed with the American investor 
Daniel Ludwig and the deal with Japan regarding the construction of the Itaipu Dam.  
Daniel Ludwig was an international shipping tycoon, who was granted 3.7 million 
acres at the Jary River, a tributary of the Amazon River, east of Belem, at that time 
the largest private landholding, purchased for the sum of 3 million dollars (Maurer 
1979, Skidmore 1990). His holding consisted primarily of tropical trees that were 
used to produce pulp for paper. Even though this deal was sealed under the previous 
Médici-government (and even encouraged with a ten years tax exemption from 
Brazil’s value-added tax and a guarantee for an $200 million US loan), the Geisel 
government did not withdraw its political support from the Jari Project (Skidmore 
1990).  Jari project serves as an ultimate example of dependent development during 
the Geisel administration. Ludwig’s landholding was a foreign enclave on Brazilian 
territory, where virtually everything was produced for export purposes and everything 
and everyone was dependent on one foreign company, led by an 82-year old 
American landowner (Braga de Miguez Garrido Filha 1980; Pojo de Rego 1998).  
 
Antônio Carlos Pojo de Rogo argued that the Brazilian miracle had put rural 
exploitation on the agenda, but the old alliance between the military elites and 
wealthy landowners left land reforms out of the question (Pojo de Rogo 1998, p. 
190).Hence foreign investments in Brazil were encouraged, which often offered little 
advantages for local people, is it projects like Jari only offered a limited number of 
unskilled jobs. This meant that the only the elites could afford the products that were 
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being produced. The Triple Alliance of dependent development was thus 
strengthened. The state looked to attract foreign capital by providing a beneficial 
investing climate by creating tax advantages and had the capital-intensive export 
enriched the local elites, while all three parties of the Triple Alliance shared the need 
to subordinate and repress the lower classes.  The Jari project is not the only example. 
Close cooperation between Brazil and Japan led to the construction of a hydropower 
plant and a smeltery with an annual production of up to 340.000 tons (Ozawa 1979, p. 
135). The ownership was almost jointly shared (51-49%) between the Brazilian and 
Japanese national mining companies. But also other Amazon development projects 
like the building of the Transamazonian highway and the creation of the Tucurui 
power plant with Japanese investment, show how quick political and economic 
interest hamper sustained, long-term economic development and therefore diversified 
Brazil’s economy, but did not enhance autonomy, as Brazil retained its dependent 
status.  
 
3.3 Brazil as a nuclear power: the 1975 nuclear deal with West-Germany 
 
A third interesting aspect of the Geisel administration foreign policy is the Brazil’s 
nuclear agreement with West-Germany in June 1975, aimed to acquire nuclear know-
how and technology to complete the nuclear fuel cycle.  
These Brazilian attempts date back to the 1950’s. Already since the Kubitschek-
administration, several programmes have been established to acquire nuclear self-
sufficiency, of which the creation of the CNEN (Commissão National de Energia 
Nuclear), the National Nuclear Energy Commission, is the most important. However, 
since the military takeover gave an impetus to nuclear development, driven by global 
hegemony ambitions and Brazil’s envisioned new role in the world (Kincade and 
Bertram 1982; Dominguez 1994). According to Kincade and Bertram (1982, p. 123), 
the battle for nuclear leadership in Latin-America, ‘reflects the pattern of their 
traditional struggle for dominance on the continent.’ The military regimes in Brazil 
and Argentina got entangled in a run for local dominance, in which both did not want 
to stay behind on nuclear know-how.  This stance also reflected in Brazil’s refusal to 
sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. 
The argument that was made in Brazil, and likewise in many developing countries, 
was that nuclear power would become of increasing relevance to meet the country’s 
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energy needs in the aftermath of the 1973 Oil Crisis, when nuclear energy was seen as 
the ‘panacea of the energy problem’ (Krugman p. 32).  Brazil wanted to avoid a high 
dependency on foreign sources of energy, which had come to the fore after the Oil 
Crisis. An adviser entrusted to Geisel that, as energy was the driving force of any 
developing country, the best weapon of development would be a large-scale 
employment of nuclear energy (Geisel, p. 1400).  
However, the US were out of the question for a potential nuclear partner, due to the 
stringent anti-proliferation measures it had adopted after India exploded a nuclear 
device in 1974 (Perera 1984.) The Ford-administration put severe pressure on the 
Brazilian government to alter its nuclear programme and ultimately sign the NPT. 
Despite fervid critics from the US government did not prevent the construction of the 
country’s first power plant, the Angra I, in 1971.  
The anti-proliferation advocated by the US resulted in the refusal by the Ford-
administration to supply nuclear technology to countries that had not signed the NPT 
(Hurrell 2013). This made the Geisel administration turn towards another 
industrialized country, resulting in 1975 Nuclear Agreement with West-Germany, the 
‘largest transfer ever made of nuclear technology to a developing country’ (Kincade 
and Bertram, p. 124). The deal that was concluded between Brazil and West-Germany 
comprised of the construction of eight nuclear power plants by 1990 and the creation 
of several facilities by joint Brazilian-West German companies for the enrichment of 
uranium as well as plutonium reprocessing (Perera 1984; Krugman 1981; Gosling 
1975). 
Despite initial objections by the US government, it was not until the accession of 
Jimmy Carter, in January 1977, that Brazil’s foreign policy started to attain full-scale 
international attention. Brazil’s nuclear policy and its human rights abuses (which will 
be discussed in the next chapter) were two bullet points that dominantly figured on 
Carter’s Latin-American agenda. On assuming office, Carter started a widespread 
public campaign to ban nuclear proliferation. It initially started with an attempt by 
vice-president Walter Mondale visited the West-German president Helmut Schmidt, 
in an attempt to persuade him to suspend the German-Brazilian agreement, however 
fruitless (Nedal, 2013). Subsequent attempts to alter Geisel’s nuclear policy proved 
equally unproductive.  
The reluctance by the West-German government to bow for US pressures 
seemingly increased Brazil’s bargaining position on the international stage. As Hurrell 
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(2009, p. 288) notes, ’the determination of the German government to honor the 
agreement seemed to provide clear German willingness to provide exactly the kind of 
alternative political support that Brazil needed to strengthen its bargaining position 
vis-à-vis the United States.’’ 
The assertion of independence to decide over the course of its nuclear programme 
had enhanced Brazil’s picture as a sovereign nation, even though the costs were high 
and nuclear development would be fully dependent on West-Germany. Prime-minister 
Silveira described the agreement with West-Germany as a ‘res inter alias acta’ and 
therefore ‘unwilling to discuss with the US specifications of the agreement of which 
they are no part’4 (Azeredo da Silveira, pp. 544-549).  However, in the years 
predating the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty between the US and the Soviet 
Union, Brazil possessing advanced nuclear technology was perceived as undesirable 
in both countries. This proved to be an impediment for Brazil’s nuclear agenda.  
Already in 1975, several safeguards were installed over the agreement, which 
placed any nuclear activity under auspices of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy 
Agency), which ‘imposed severe limits to the range of research and experimentation 
that could be done in Brazil with materials, technology and facilities associated with 
the German agreement’ (Nedal 2013, p. 1). Contractual commitments were to be 
installed, which conditioned Brazil to accept IAEA safeguards over its nuclear 
programme, otherwise the supply fuel for nuclear plant Angra-I would be terminated 
(Perera 1984). Both the US, France, The Soviet Union and the Netherlands put severe 
pressure on the West-German government in order to prevent the spread of uranium 
enrichment technology to the Third World, which had its success: in 1977 Schmidt 
promised to end the grand-scale fuel sales to Brazil (Gray 2012).   
The embargo on the transfer of proven enrichment technology, left the ‘jet nozzle’ 
(an aerodynamic uranium technology) that separates as Brazil’s only access to 
enriched uranium. However, this technology was only in a laboratory stage of 
development, with no German guarantee of success (Krugmann 1980).  
Also the costs further impeded the 1975 agreements. The initial projections of the 
costs were projected around $5 billion, but were by 1979 estimated around $20 to $30 
billion, as put forward by both Hartmut Krugmann and Judith Perera in 1980. In the 
                                           
4 This is the online accessible archive of minister of foreign affairs Azeredo da 
Silveira. Hereafter this archive will be referred to as (Azeredo da Silveira, name 
page). The link is enlisted in the bibliography. 
 23 
 
end, only one of the projected eight reactors was ever completed. Secondly, 
Krugmann argued, the complete dependence on foreign technology and managerial 
skills are counterproductive, as the model of implementation of the agreement favored 
multinationals that were commissioned with selling nuclear technology (particularly 
Hoechst and Bayer), while the Brazilian company Nuclebras was merely burdened 
with the investments in infrastructure (Krugmann 1980; Vizentini 1998). 
Abovementioned reasons eventually led to moderate results, compared to the scope 
of the initial agreement. The entire nuclear agreement was executed by a joint-venture 
of Nuclebras (Brazil’s nuclear corporation) and KWU (Kraftwerk Union, the nuclear 
branch of Siemens), with little attention paid to the Brazilian scientific community. It 
was the armed forces that dominated the nuclear agenda. Nor was there any central 
organ nuclear organ (Kutchesfahani 2013).  Despite the ‘largest nuclear agreement 
ever made’ yielding marginal results caused by international pressure, dependence on 
foreign technology and economic harness, Brazil showed its assertiveness to make its 
own decisions. It proved unyielding to US pressures to abandon the deal and likewise 
the German reluctance to do so proved that Brazil was being seen as an equal 
economic alternative by West-Germany.  
Nevertheless, Brazil’s nuclear agreement was a show-off of Geisel’s determination 
to bargain for the best outcome and avoid automatic alliances, especially with the US.  
When nuclear power was perceived as the panacea to the energy problem, and the 
battle with Argentina for Latin-American hegemony was up and running, Brazil was 
one of several developing countries to aim for nuclear independence. In an era when 
nuclear deterrence gained momentum and the first SALT negotiations were under 
way, this plan proved to be too ambitious and international barriers prevented the 
transfer of proven enrichment technology to Brazil (Nedal 2013; Vizentini 1995). 
This resulted in a dependence on West-Germany on nuclear technology that later 
proved to be economically impractical and because of its high costs even unviable 
(Krugmann 1980; Vizentini 1995; Nedal 2013). However, Brazil managed to 
champion its right to decide its own energy agenda, whereby it successfully defied the 
US to sign its own agreement with another industrialized country. This was an 
important asset of responsible pragmatism’s promise to diversify its economic 
partnerships, which led to a severe cool-off in US-Brazil relations. 
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3.4 Habitat for Humanity: Jimmy Carter and the deterioration of US-Brazil 
relations 
 
The 1975 Nuclear Agreement was not the only source of discord between the US and 
Brazil. As aforementioned, when president Carter assumed office, the diplomatic ties 
between both countries suffered from a severe blow.  
Already in his election campaign, Carter presented himself as an advocate for 
human rights and nuclear deterrence. Given Brazil’s frequent human rights abuses and 
its ambitions to become a nuclear power, a clash was almost inevitable. In its 
historical context, it is not hard to think of the possible motivations for Carter’s 
stance. In the rapidly changing world of developing countries, newborn colonies and 
the détente in the Cold War, the US, itself recovering from the deception in Vietnam 
and the scandalous Watergate-crisis, had to assert itself on other fields than just the 
economy and military, but also as a promotor of values and ideals. Hence human 
rights and nuclear deterrence entered the political discourse and started to be used as 
an active foreign policy tool.  
Already before Carter had assumed office, the American Congress had issued the 
1976 Harkin Amendment, which required the State Department to write an annual 
report on the condition of human right in any country received financial aid from the 
US. (Skidmore 1990, Losito 2013) The first report was to be expected by 1977 and 
described the situation in Brazil as ‘partially free’ and acknowledged several 
infringements of personal freedom but also stated that ‘several improvements had 
been made in law enforcement activities’ (Losito 2013, p. 75).   
The Brazilian reaction resembled the response that was given to American pressure 
to cancel the nuclear agreement and also this report was seen as an intolerable 
interference, a res inter alias acta. In a telegram to the Mexican president Portillo, 
Geisel explained that ‘Brazil could not accept interference in affairs that are 
considered exclusively internal’ and described US policy as ‘exceedingly 
interventionist’ (Geisel, p. 1889).  American interference further aroused Brazilian 
nationalism, as Geisel expressed his disapproval about the lack of awareness in the 
US about Brazil’s new position in the world. This meant that Brazil had the right to 
protect its interests in response to acts of hostility or interference on the part of the 
United States.  
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As a result, the Brazilian government did not accept interference in exchange for 
military aid and decided to unilaterally denounce the U.S.-Brazilian Military 
Agreement, which had been in effect March 1952, followed by a refusal in advance of 
any military assistance for 1977. It was a symbolic gesture, as the agreements had 
little utility for Brazil, as Brazil could already provide 80% of its arms consumption 
(Vizentini 1998; Losito 2013; Hurrell 2013; Schwam-Baird 2013). This period 
marked the lowest point in US-Brazil relations.  
In an attempt to repair the damage, First Lady Rosalyn Carter traveled to Brasilia 
in June 1977, in order to ‘reaffirm her husband’s commitment to the international 
respect of human rights but to try to keep open at the same time a dialogue with the 
Latin American most powerful nation’ (Losito 2013, p. 81). In a personal 
conversation between Rosalyn Carter and president Geisel, the two major sources of 
discord were raised again. As seen in the previous paragraph, nuclear energy was 
perceived as a necessity for the maintenance of Brazil’s security. On human rights, 
Geisel mentioned that ‘this problem in Brazil cannot be solved overnight. In a poor 
country like Brazil, the solution depends on progressive efforts. A lot has been done 
in this country to implant a solid economic base, with the social repercussions this 
produces. Plenty of efforts have been made in the housing sector, the food sector, 
health care and education. However, one cannot ignore the necessity to fight intrinsic 
difficulties that are faced by every less developed country’ (Geisel, p. 1547). 
The divergence between Brazil and US pointed out some interesting aspects of 
responsible pragmatism. Brazil did not deny human rights altogether, but considered it 
to be an internal affair with respect to state sovereignty, while the US regarded human 
rights as an universal value (equal to how human rights are nowadays perceived as a 
fundamental principle of international law).  
Brazil’s notion that outside interference in internal matters, even on topics like 
nuclear energy and human rights, was inappropriate and unacceptable was a 
consequence of their new international position. Any attempt to intervene was 
perceived as unwillingness to accept the Brazil’s new position in the world. On 
human rights, the US did not take any far-reaching measures against Brazil following 
Rosalyn Carter’s visit. Controversial topics were looked after in discretion (Vizentini 
1990). This indicated that the US was willing to accept Brazil’s sovereignty on this 
terrain, in return for not risking to lose a potential ally.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has aimed to provide an answer whether Geisel’s newly introduced foreign 
policy of responsible pragmatism has succeeded to lead Brazil away from the 
dependent development model by enhancing its autonomy to act independently on the 
world stage and if responsible pragmatism implied a fundamentally new approach to 
foreign policy in Brazil. 
As seen in the first chapters, Geisel’s responsible pragmatism was not radically 
different from the foreign policy of his predecessors. Practical Equilibrium and the 
Política Externa Independente were early versions to pursue an independent foreign 
policy and avert automatic alliances, in order to maximize economic benefits. 
Tensions with the US were already used by presidents Vargas and Kubitschek to 
make new economic partnerships. For Brazil, revising its foreign policy in favor of 
national development is in line with the country’s historical tendencies. What makes 
responsible pragmatism an unique chapter of Brazil’s political history is the historical 
context in which it was drafted. The early seventies had brought enormous economic 
growth to the country, known as the Brazilian miracle. Annual growth rates of 8% 
were being achieved in a period of upward industrialization. Furthermore, 
‘international equation’ had left a power vacuum in international politics, since the 
hegemony of the US was declining and the Cold War was experiencing the détente. In 
this context, Brazil was reshaping its role in the world. Spurred by economic success, 
its territorial vastness and its large population, Brazilian authorities felt the country 
had to pick up its responsibilities and assume its role as a major player on the world 
stage. In the aftermath of the 1973 Oil Crisis, economic difficulties dominated the 
foreign policy agenda. Therefore, a new policy was needed, pragmatic in character, 
unbound by international obligations and aimed at calculating the best bargain. It is 
therefore not surprising that tensions aggravated in US-Brazil relations. The seventies 
can aptly be described as a definitive end of the special relationship between the US 
and Brazil.  
The economic development in this period can still be described as Peter Evans’ 
‘dependent development.’  Geisel’s Arab Turn and is a good example of how 
dependency on imported petrol could induce the authorities to radically alter its 
political agenda and break with historical tendencies to meet economic needs. 
However, the best example is the exploitation of the Amazon. In order to maintain 
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economic growth, multinationals and foreign capitalist were given carte-blanche to 
exploit its resources for export purposes. This took place in the Triple Alliance of 
multinationals, local capital and the state, all sharing the interest to subordinate the 
local population. 
However, in other situations, Brazil managed to assert itself on the world stage and 
to act in relative autonomy. The diversification was set in motion with the nuclear 
deal with West-Germany, despite international pressure form especially the US. 
Albeit the deal did not bring Brazil nuclear independence, due to several safeguards 
that were a result from this international pressure, the principles of ‘res inter alias 
acta’ to strictly denounce outside interference in internal matters were not abandoned. 
Nuclear deterrence and human rights were the two most urgent matters in which 
Brazil could assert its autonomy. Despite frequent US condemnations of its human 
rights practices and its nuclear agenda, Brazil remained unyielding for outside 
interference. Responsible pragmatism rejected any automatic and diversified 
partnerships (not only with West-Germany and the Middle East, but also with Japan 
and newborn Third World countries). Economic and political ties had been expanded 
to all over the world, even though this often took place in a scenario in which Brazil 
acted in a dependent position. Also not all of its foreign policy objectives were 
obtained, improvements were significant. On the two most important fields of 
divergence, nuclear policy and human rights, it successfully defied the US as the most 
influential global actor. The absence of any radical political or economic from the part 
of the US against Brazil, showed that the country had more to win with Brazil’s new 
role in the world than with risking to lose a potential ally. Therefore, political 
autonomy was enhanced, economic relations diversified, but the development that 
‘responsible pragmatism’ yielded, in several cases retained its dependent status.  
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